Economics of Increased Beef Grader Accuracy by Ibarburu, Maro A. et al.
Economics of Increased Beef Grader Accuracy
by
Maro A. Ibarburu, John D. Lawrence, 
and Darrell Busby
Suggested citation format:
Ibarburu, M. A., J. D. Lawrence, and D. Busby. 2007. “Economics of 
Increased Beef Grader Accuracy.” Proceedings of the NCCC-134 Conference 
on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk 
Management. Chicago, IL. [http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/nccc134].Economics of Increased Beef Grader Accuracy 
 
Maro A. Ibarburu,  







Paper presented at the NCCC-134 Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, 
Forecasting, and Market Risk Management. Chicago, Illinois, April 16-17, 2007 
 
 
Copyright 2007 by Maro A. Ibarburu, John D. Lawrence and Darrell Busby. All rights 
reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes 
by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
 
* Ibarburu is a research associate, Lawrence is a professor and Busby is an Extension beef 
specialist at Iowa State University. The authors gratefully acknowledge Tri-County Steer 
Carcass Futurity Program for the use of their data.   1
Economics of Increased Beef Grader Accuracy 
Practitioner’s abstract 
Carcass data from more than 38,000 cattle was used to compare the called and measured 
yield grade in two different periods: before and after the slaughter plant incorporated 
another grader in the line to improve grading accuracy. The study shows that the graders 
accuracy significantly increased. The higher accuracy affected all yield grades, but most 
notably resulted in more called yield grade 4 and 5 carcasses. This analysis will develop 
insight of what will be the effect of instrument grading that will be more accurate than 
previously called grades.  
The results are expressed as the conditional distribution of the called yield grade for a given 
value of the measured yield grade. The pricing grid currently used by the industry was used 
to analyze the effect of the graders errors on the expected values of the premiums on both 
periods and by yield grade. The results show that the company has an incentive to improve 
accuracy of grading.  Simulating the results of measured vs. called yield grade over prices at 
the time and a standard industry grid showed that the plant can benefit by $1.32 per head by 
increasing grading accuracy. 
Keywords: cattle, carcass grading, accuracy, economics of grading 
Introduction 
On October 23, 2006 USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) formally approved 
image-based instrument grading to evaluate marbling scores in beef carcasses. The two 
specific vision camera systems (the VBS2000 and Computer Vision System) had previously 
been approved for assessment of USDA yield grades and both were found to accurately 
predict marbling scores. The incorporation of this technology will allow USDA graders to 
predict quality and yield grades more precisely at line speed (Wheeler, Shackelford and 
Koohmaraie) with the following consequences:  
•  It will permit the packers to better sort carcasses to the product that maximizes carcass 
value. (Peck, 2006) 
•  It will help more accurately pay the producer for the true quality of their carcasses 
eliminating the situation where lower quality carcasses are subsidized by higher 
quality carcasses because of grading errors. (Peck, 2006) 
•  Increased accuracy will help producers better understand the effects of their 
management decisions on the final quality and value of their product creating an 
incentive to track their animals individually and keep better records. Wheeler, 
Shackelford and Koohmaraie 
Cross and Whittaker (1992) stated the need to develop a system for instrument 
assessment of carcass value because the people raising cattle feel that the present subjective 
system did not give sufficient confidence to the producer. 
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The consequence of grading errors is that some material is classified in a grade different 
that the one it really belongs. The “contamination” of high quality product with low-quality 
product and vice versa is reflected in the prices of both, so that the market fails to properly 
reward the technological investment, paying a higher-than-deserved price to non-invested 
producers and more importantly a lower-than-deserved price to invested producers (Chalfant 
and Sexton, 2002). This uncertainty in the grading and testing mechanisms results in a 
systematic underinvestment under a price-grade type incentive structure (Hennessy, 1996; 
Chalfant et. al., 1999).  “The problem may be particularly relevant for products where quality 
is hard to identify in raw product, or where quality is at a significant premium.” (Hennessy, 
1996) 
While not the case for beef, an additional but not less important problem is that the 
grading is often conducted by the processor and it can be arbitrary, making the producer 
vulnerable to manipulation as pointed out by Hennessy in 1996. This is another cause of 
underinvestment because some producers that don’t trust the industry will not consider 
investing in quality improving technologies, even when incentives for better quality outweigh 
the costs of producing it. A different result was obtained by Bogetoft and Ballebye (2003), 
who found that in a competitive environment when trading occurs before grading, grading 
errors do not create incentive problems. Bogetoft and Ballebye considered that the processors 
will use more high-powered incentives to compensate producers for the lack of reliable 
information (because competition will lead them to do so), while Chalfant et. al., 1999 
considered that processors will use less powered incentives to protect themselves for the lack 
of reliable information. 
But the equipment and other costs associated with its use are not inexpensive. Peck 
(2006) estimates that the price tag is about $250,000/system, and there are other costs that go 
along with it such as cost of service contracts, software updates, training, etc. Therefore the 
use of the new system should return the companies at least these costs.  
There is a concern between some participants of the beef industry about the increasing 
number of carcass called yield grade 4 and yield grade 5.  Hueth, Lawrence and Marcoul 
(2004) showed that the graders errors in the predictions of the yield grade shift the proportion 
of the called yield grade to the middle of the distribution. They also explained that even 
though there is not incentive structure for the graders, calling yield grades 4 and 5 would 
draw more attention to their work given the high discounts associated with these grades. 
Therefore an increase in the accuracy of the graders would probably increase the percentage 
of called yield grades 4 and 5 as well as yield grades 1. Accuracy of yield and quality grade is 
expected to improve in the future as USDA approves and packers adopt instrument grading 
because it provides a more objective method of determing grades. 
On 06/30/2003 the slaughter plant where these cattle are slaughtered made an effort to 
increase the graders accuracy. This effort consisted in incorporating a second grader on the 
line.  From then on one grader calls the quality grade and the other calls the yield grade, in 
that way both graders have more time to call the attribute and focus on only one grade. For   3
the rest of the paper we will call Period 1 the period before 06/30/2003 and Period 2 the 
period after 06/30/2003. 
This paper shows the percentage of measured yield grades and USDA called yield grades 
for two times periods (before and after the second grader was included) and analyzes the 
change in the graders accuracy compared to professionally measured carcass grades. 
Materials and Methods 
Individual animal data representing 38,856 cattle (28,146 steers and 10,710 heifers) fed in 12 
Iowa feedlots between 2000 and 2006 were analyzed for this project. The dataset reports 
feedlot performance variables for each animal and carcass traits among other things. Carcass 
measurements for fat thickness (FT), ribeye area (REA), and estimated kidney, pelvic, and 
heart (KPH) fat are taken by trained and experienced technicians that collect carcass data 
daily in the plant.  
The measured yield grade was estimated using the following USDA equation: 
Predicted yield= 2.50 + 2.5*FT + 0.20*KPH+ 0.0038* HCW – 0.32* REA, where “HCW” is 
the hot carcass weight. 
The predicted yield grade from the equation above is rounded to the next lower integer. For 
example; the yield grade 2 is for predicted yield between 2.0 and 2.99 (Hueth, Lawrence, and 
Marcoul, 2004). 
The measured and called yield grade distribution was estimated for two different time 
periods (January 2000- June 2003 and July 2003 - June 2006) to see if they had changed over 
time. The graders’ called yield grade was compared with the measured yield grade for each 
animal for the two different time periods.  The results are expressed as the conditional 
distribution of the called yield grade for a given value of the measured yield grade. 
Then the yield grade premiums were estimated for the called and the measured yield 
grade and the premiums were compared to see the effects of grading errors on received 
premiums and who benefited from them. 
Results 
The cattle in the dataset have significantly fewer yield grade 4 and 5 cattle than the national 
average.  Much of this lower level can be attributed to management and careful sorting at 
slaughter.  Even though the percentage of measured yield grade 4 and 5 decreased from 
2.59% to 1.99% between these 2 periods (table 1), the percentage of called yield grade 4 and 
5increased from 1.49% to 1.98%. Moreover the percentage of measured yield grade 1 
increased from 7.37% to 9.36% but the percentage of called yield grade 1 increased even 
more, from 7.26% to 10.30%. The decrease in the percentage called yield grade 3 
compensates the others.   4
 
Table 1: Evolution of the Measured and Called Yield Grade Distributions
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
YG 1 7.37% 9.36% 7.26% 10.30%
YG 2 49.82% 53.69% 50.61% 49.78%
YG 3 40.22% 34.96% 40.64% 37.95%
YG 4 2.56% 1.94% 1.46% 1.89%
YG 5 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 0.09%
Measured Distribution Called Distribution
 
Comparing the diagonals in table 2 shows that the accuracy of the graders increased in the 
second period with respect to the first one for all the yield grades, and most of the increase in 
the accuracy are in the extreme yield grades where they were less precise in the past. For 
example: in the Period 1 they only predicted 58.2% of the yield grade 1 correctly but for the 
Period 2 they predicted 86.9% of the yield grade 1 correctly. 
i\j Yield 1 Yield 2 Yield 3 Yield 4 Yield 5 i\j Yield 1 Yield 2 Yield 3 Yield 4 Yield 5
YG 1 58.2% 5.9% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% YG 1 86.9% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
YG 2 41.0% 76.8% 23.2% 0.5% 0.0% YG 2 12.7% 86.3% 6.5% 0.0% 0.0%
YG 3 0.8% 17.3% 76.1% 52.7% 0.0% YG 3 0.4% 9.7% 92.9% 10.8% 0.0%
YG 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 46.4% 42.9% YG 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 87.1% 11.1%
YG 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 57.1% YG 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 88.9%
Table 2: Probability that the Called YG=i Given that the Measured Yield=j for Both Sexes in Both 
Periods ... Prob(YG=i | Yield=j)
Note: The numbers in the diagonal of the table represent the percentage of observations predicted correctly 
for each yield grade.
Period 1 (before 06/30/2003) Period 2 (after 06/30/2003)
 
The distribution of the yield grades is pretty much concentrated around yield grade 2 and 
3 (table 1), therefore it is expected that under no aditional information or when there are 
doubts the graders tend to call yield grade 2 or 3, shifting the distribution of the called yield 
grade to the mode of the sample yield grade 2 or 3. It can be seen that the errors in measured 
yield grades are asymetric where for example is more likely to call a yield grade 3 than a 
yield grade 1 when the measured yield grade is 2. Similarly it is more likely to call a yield 
grade 2 than a yield grade 4 when the measured yield grade is 3. Hueth, Lawrence, and 
Marcoul (2004) developed a behavioral model for the graders where they show how do the 
errors compare with the actual yield grade expected value and distribution.  
What motivates a packer or industry to invest in more accurate grading? Table 3 shows 
the expected value of the called yield grade premiums and the expected value of the 
measured yield grade premiums if no errors were made by the graders. One interesting thing 
to see is that the graders errors in the first period caused the packer to pay an average of 
$1.32/head more premiums that they would pay if the yield grade could be measured without 
errors.  In the second period packers paid an average of $0.15/head less premiums that they 
would pay if the yield grade could be measured without errors. Both differences are different 
than zero with 95% confidence but this difference is close to zero for the Period 2. This is a 
plant that slaughtered approximately 9,000 head per week. Therefore, if this dataset were 
representative of the animals slaughtered by the plant the grading errors cost the plant   5
approximately $11,880/week in period 1 and they were reduced to $1350/week benefit in 
period 2. The cost of buying the equipment would be paid off in approximately 21 weeks if 
they were able to eliminate the errors in period 1.  In period 2 the plant is not losing money 
because of the errors therefore there is no incentive to buy the equipment other than build 
trust among the producers that supply their cattle. 
 
Table 3: Measured and Called Yield Grade Premiums ($/head) for Both Periods
Mean St. Dev. # obs Mean St. Dev. # obs
A Measured YG premium 9.940 20.830 21703 12.320 20.260 17161
B Called YG premium 11.240 17.950 21703 12.170 20.680 17161
Difference (A-B) -1.310 15.560 21703 0.150 9.510 17161
Period 1 (before 06/30/2003) Period 2 (after 06/30/2003)
 
Table 4 shows the premiums paid by the Grid for each yield grade and the premiums that 
the producers received for a carcass grading each of the 5 grades in both periods. It can be 
seen that even though the premium offered by the grid for a yield grade 1 animal was 
$6.50/cwt in average a producer sending a yield grade 1 animal got only $4.81/cwt in period 
1 as a result of the grading errors. The similar situation was observed in the yield grade 4 
where the discount offered by the grid were $12/cwt, but a producer sending a yield grade 4 
animal was discounted only $5.63/cwt on average. This creates a decrease in the incentives to 
better manage or sort the cattle for slaughter. What it is really interesting to see if how much 
the situation improved in period 2 when the grading errors decreased and the average 
premiums gotten by the producers in each yield grade consistently approximated the 
premiums offered by the grid. 
  






YG 1 6.50 4.81 5.97
YG 2 2.50 2.30 2.42
YG 3 0.00 0.51 0.10
YG 4 -12.00 -5.63 -10.87




The grader errors caused some yield grade 1’s to be called 2 or 3 resulting in lower premiums 
for producers that send low yield grade cattle, while some yield grades 4’s and 5’s are called 
3 resulting in higher premiums for producers that send high yield grade cattle. Therefore, 
grader errors reduce the incentives causing underinvestment for improving yield grade. 
Hueth, Lawrence and Marcoul found that the errors tend to shift the proportions to the 
middle of the distribution. Therefore, it is possible that the increase in accuracy is what is 
causing that more yield grade 4's and 5's to be called giving the idea that the called yield 
grade is increasing. However, it is not clear that other plants have adopted the two grader   6
system or are using approved instrument grading to improve accuracy.  The changes in this 
one plant are not enough to account for national trends. 
The $1.32/head higher premium that the slaughter plant was paying in the first period is 
probably a good motivation to incorporate the second grader to increase the accuracy. But 
there are still some errors and they not only cause some level of underinvestment but also 
creates some loss of confidence of producers in grading. Implementing instrument grading 
could not only improve accuracy but also reduce the subjectivity level of the measure helping 
to increase producers confidence in the grading system. 
Further research may include the expected change in the incentives when the grading 
accuracy increases with the introduction of instrument grading.    7
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